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Abstract: Decision support systems are a key focus in research on developing control rooms to aid 
operators in making reliable decisions, and reducing incidents caused by human errors. For this 
purpose, models of complex systems can be developed to diagnose causes or consequences for 
specific alarms. Models applied in safety systems of complex and safety critical systems, require 
rigorous and reliable model building and testing. Multilevel Flow Modeling is a qualitative method 
for diagnosing faults, and has previously only been validated by subjective and qualitative means. 
This work aims to synthesize a procedure to measure model performance, according to diagnostic 
requirements, to ensure reliability during operation. A simple procedure is proposed for validating 
and evaluating Multilevel Flow Modeling models. For this purpose expert statements, a dynamic 
process simulation in K-spice, and pilot plant experiments are used for validation of two simple 
Multilevel Flow Modeling models of a deoiling hydrocyclone, used for water and oil separation. 
 
Keyword: Multilevel Flow Modelling, Model Validation, Water treatment, Fault Diagnosis. 
 
1 Introduction 
Decision support systems are crucial in order to 
improve the efficiency and safety of control 
systems. With an increase in system complexity 
and autonomy, the tasks for operators to analyse 
situations, of behaviours deviating from nominal 
system operation, becomes increasingly 
complicated. 
Automated fault diagnosis is a method which can 
potentially decrease the reaction time, and 
increase the probability of a correct response to 
faults. The focus of online fault diagnosis has 
primarily been on component level. Multilevel 
Flow Modeling (MFM), is a method for modelling 
the functionality of complex mass and energy flow 
systems. Models of nuclear power systems, 
electric power grids and oil production systems 
have been used for online fault diagnosis[1]. The 
method is used for modelling how low level 
functionality supports high level functionality, 
commonly referred to as means-end models. 
 
MFM has numerous different applications of 
which one is online fault diagnosis. Online fault 
diagnosis with MFM is however limited in 
application[1]–[6], whereas offline root cause 
analysis has been applied diversely. 
 
The purpose of this research project is to build 
models of an offshore water treatment system for 
oil production. These models will in future be used 
for online fault diagnosis. Initially a deoiling  
hydrocyclone is modelled and validated. The 
current methods for model validation of MFM 
models are limited in application, as the models 
primarily have been used for offline root cause 
analysis. For using such models for fault diagnosis 
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in industrial decision support systems, the models 
must be reliable. Insufficient validation of models 
for improving decision reliability may prove to be 
counterproductive, when seeking to improve the 
level of safety. 
 
No additional requirements are defined for 
advanced or intelligent control algorithms, and 
diagnostic methods in standards such as[7]. In case 
of false or absent alarms and diagnoses, operators 
may ignore such methods, and eventually solely 
rely on their own experience and intuition. In line 
with the concept of defence in depth[8], fault 
diagnosis is an addition to the monitoring level, at 
level 2, to enable either prevention or mitigation 
of faults. 
A fault diagnostic system should thus be 
considered as a safety precaution to the same 
degree as an emergency shutdown, although it’s 
function according to defence in depth is at a 
different level. Model validation is thus crucial. 
 
This paper introduces the initial work on an 
approach to validating MFM models based on 
different types of available information. It has 
been applied to simple MFM models of a deoiling 
hydrocyclone. The aim is to provide a measure of 
model performance. 
 
2 Previous validation 
Multilevel Flow Modeling is a strictly qualitative 
method. Numerical process signal are used, but 
only to produce qualitative discrete states such as 
low or high, which are then treated by the MFM 
model. This simplifies the rule base and thus the 
reasoning process significantly, and ensures a low 
computational effort when dealing with plantwide 
fault diagnosis[1]. 
Systems have typically been modelled and 
validated by an expert in MFM and a process 
expert. Based on the model, functions are 
triggered separately, and the prognosis is 
compared to the causes and consequences 
explained by a process expert. Alternatively a 
MFM and/or process expert attempt to describe 
how the MFM prognosis, relate to the fluid 
mechanics of the process system. This approach is 
subjective and qualitative. 
 
 
The majority of published research on the topic of 
MFM is not concerned with the validity of the 
models. This is very problematic, as many models 
are presented, with no information on how well 
they model the physical system. The published 
research addressing validation includes examples 
of comparison of expert opinions to cause-
consequence fault trees, to counter-actions for 
recovery generated based on the MFM model 
predictions, and to fault trees published in 
scientific literature[9][10][11]. 
More recently model prongnoses have been 
compared to standardized operation procedures 
(SOP) available in published standards and 
numerical process simulations[12]. The SOP and 
MFM prognoses were presented in a table for easy 
comparison as a basis for a qualitative 
evaluation[13]. In addition different theoretical 
aspects of MFM model validation are discussed 
in[14].  
The previously mentioned approaches all focus on 
the validity of the model based on the output 
produced from a specific input. The causal 
relations between functions have been discussed 
by Larsson and Berquist, and a correlation method 
was presented to determine the causal relationship 
between functions[15] [16]. The validity of the causal 
relationships are the only examples of validation 
of the structure of MFM models. Apart from this, 
the structure is only treated as a part of verification, 
according to a defined MFM syntax[14]. 
 
3 Hydrocyclone 
The validation method will be used for a case on a 
simple model of a hydrocyclone. A hydrocyclone 
is a passive component used for separation of 
water and oil in offshore produced water treatment 
(PWT). It has one inlet, and two outlets. If the 
process conditions are optimal, the oil leaves the 
hydrocyclone through the overflow outlet, and the 
water through the underflow outlet as shown in 
Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1 Example of water and oil flow in a hydrocylone[17] 
The common control strategy is based on the 
pressure drop ratio (PDR) defined as the ratio 
between the pressure difference from inlet to 
overflow ΔPo and from inlet to underflow ΔPu as 
shown in Equation (1)[18].  
𝑷𝑫𝑹 =
∆𝑷𝒐
∆𝑷𝒖
=
𝑷𝒊−𝑷𝒐
𝑷𝒊−𝑷𝒐
    (1)  
As the density of water is higher than that of oil, 
the centrifugal force of the water exceeds the 
centrifugal force of the oil particles. The inlet flow 
enters tangentially to the conical geometry of the 
hydrocyclone, thus passively generating a rotating 
flow. This results in the water moving outwards, 
towards the hydrocyclone wall in a vortex, and the 
oil to be displaced towards the centre of the 
hydrocyclone, in a vortex.  
 
The separation efficiency of the hydrocyclone, 
does not only depend on the PDR, but also on 
flow-split, inlet flow rate, oil droplet size, 
distribution, and geometry. The flow-split is 
proportional to the PDR, and it can defined as the 
ratio between the overflow flowrate Qo, and the 
input flowrate Qi[19]: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 =
𝑄𝑜
𝑄𝑖
   (2)  
The separation performance depends not only on 
the flow-split and PDR, but also on the oil droplet 
size and the oil content, two parameters which are 
not controlled. The PDR is controlled, by using 
two control valves at each outlet. The 
hydrocyclone used for experimental work is 
shown in Fig. 2. The setup has a pressure and flow 
sensor on all in- and outlets, and one control valve 
on each outlet. The input water is delivered from 
a water tank by a pump. Both the underflow and 
overflow output is transported to the same water 
tank. 
 
Fig. 2 P&ID of the hydrocyclone at the pilot plant. 
The standard offshore application of 
hydrocyclones involves upstream separation, in 
three-phase separation tanks. The underflow valve 
is then used for controlling the water level in the 
three-phase separation tank, and the overflow 
valve controls the PDR.  
In this application, any other processes but the 
hydrocyclone are bypassed, and the underflow 
valve has no real-time control. In a standard 
application, the hydrocyclone is placed in a bundle 
of hydrocyclones, between which the inlet water 
is split. This is however not the case in this 
particular application, where only a single 
hydrocyclone is used. 
 
4 MFM Model 
As a case study, only a part of the full MFM model 
of the hydrocyclone will be used to prove and 
present the principle of this validation method. 
This part is the mass flow, shown in Fig. 3. As can 
be seen from the figure, there are six transport 
functions, of which three represent the three 
flowrate sensors, and three storage functions 
representing the pressure sensors. A balance 
represents the mass balance of flow from inlet to 
underflow and overflow. 
 
Fig. 3 MFM Model of hydrocyclone mass flow separation. 
The model shown in Fig. 3, can potentially be used 
as two different models, by having two different 
representations of the sensors. The component to 
function mapping will thus be the only difference 
between the two models. The two models and their 
respective mappings are shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1 MFM Models 
Model Qi Qu Qo Pi Pu Po 
MFM v1.0 tra1 tra3 tra2 sto1 sto3 sto2 
MFM v1.1 tra4 tra6 tra5 sto1 sto3 sto2 
 
 
5 Validation Method 
The purpose of having a structured methodology for 
validating MFM models for fault diagnostic 
applications includes:  
1. Performance comparison of one model, on 
different sets of faults, to determine the 
suitability of MFM models for specific faults or 
systems. 
2. Comparison of different models and versions on 
the same set of faults to track and ensure 
progression during model building. 
3. Comparison of different versions of the MFM 
methodology on the same set of faults, to track 
and ensure improvement on development of the 
MFM methodology of e.g. the rule base and 
reasoning. 
4. Performance comparison of MFM with other 
fault diagnostic methods on the same set of 
faults, to determine the suitability of MFM for 
specific systems or faults, compared to other 
methods. 
A graphical illustration of these four purposes, are 
shown in Fig. 4. The figure depicts defined sets of 
faults, marked by bold circles, in comparison to 
diagnostic prognoses (predictions), marked by filled 
circles. If a model can predict all of the defined faults, 
the bold and filled circles align, and are equal in size. 
 
Fig. 4 Model comparison of MFM on fault sets by performance 
evaluation. 
The model validation of MFM models can be 
separated into three stages, based on the available 
information at each stage. These stages are System 
Concept, System Design and System Operation.  
In the first stage, System Concept, when generating 
the system concept, the only available information 
may very well be P&ID diagrams, expert opinions 
and preliminary Hazard and Operability Study 
(HAZOP) results. This information can be used to 
build the MFM model, and validate it. In the next 
stage, System Design, flowsheets, mass, energy and 
momentum balance calculations, process module 
specifications and Dynamic Process Simulations 
(DPS) may be available. System Operation, the final 
step, could very well be carried out as a part of 
commissioning. At this stage, the physical system is 
available for experimentation, and can thus include 
online fault diagnosis of faults emulated on the 
physical plant. For this work, a pilot plant (PP) of an 
offshore system will be used. The validation 
procedure for each stage is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Modeling and validation stages of MFM models. 
The previously published validation approaches, are 
all related to the System Concept stage, apart from 
the methods introduced by Larsson and Wu. The 
validation of MFM models at each stage can be 
considered as engineering validation of the models. 
Future work will include a scientific validation of the 
three engineering validation approaches, by 
combining the models and information of different 
types, from each of the three stages, to examine the 
discrepancies between the models. In the case of no 
or only little discrepancy, it is assumed that models 
can be validated at each stage, by using this 
procedure. 
 
Modelling and Validation of a Hydrocylone for Fault Diagnosis using Multilevel Flow Modeling 
 ISOFIC 2017, Gyeongju, Korea, November 26-30, 2017 5 
5 
6 Validation 
Conventional diagnostic methods are used for 
modelling a specific set of faults, to distinguish 
between these, and any other behaviour. In theory, 
MFM can distinguish between faults, that have not 
been defined. The models describes the systems at a 
generic and qualitative level, capable of generating 
propagation paths and prognoses automatically, 
based on evidence. 
For this reason, it is important to also validate the 
structure of the model and not only the prognoses. 
To increase the fidelity of such prognoses, it is 
important that the model representation of the 
system behaviour, functionality, and causality is 
correct. This paper deals with the validity of 
relations between functions, to determine how well 
they reflect the physical system. 
 
If such relations are valid, the non-validated 
prognoses of the MFM model, will be assumed 
correct. As an example, four scenarios have been 
defined and tested for each of the three stages. The 
valve positions of Vu and Vo have been opened and 
closed a defined amount individually. The fault is 
implemented as a position control offset of the valve 
setpoint (SP) in both the DPS, and on the PP. An 
overview of how the fault has been implemented in 
MFM, on the PP, in the DPS, and as expert 
statements is shown in Table 2. The valve position 
range for Vu and Vo is [0 100%] where 0 is fully 
closed, and 100% is fully fully opened. 
Table 2 MFM Models 
Fault Expert DPS PP MFM 
Vu ÷ Vu close Vu SP ÷3 %  Vu SP ÷3 %  Qu Low 
Vu + Vu open Vu SP +3 % Vu SP +3 % Qu High 
Vo ÷ Vo close Vo SP ÷20 % Vo SP ÷20 % Qo Low 
Vo + Vo open Vo SP +20 % Vo SP +20 % Qo High 
 
1.1 System Concept 
At the concept level, no numerical information will 
be available, apart from what can be found in 
literature. The only other source of information at 
this stage, will most likely be estimations and 
experience-based statements of experts. When 
designing chemical process systems, a Hazard and 
Operability Study (HAZOP) will be carried out, for 
compliance with safety. The format of a HAZOP is 
as follows: 
 
1. Which hazards can arise, given a physical 
property (flowrate) changes (increases) in the 
hydrocyclone?  
2. What are the causes? 
3. What are the consequences? 
4. What are the safeguards? 
 
Thus, the purpose is not to identify the system 
behavior but to identify safety critical operation, and 
the corresponding causes and consequences. In 
addition, safeguards must be proposed to alleviate 
faults. However as it is based on a physical property 
such as the flowrate, and an instance such as a 
decrease, it can be used as a basis for specifying the 
operational behaviour in a structured manner when 
identifying causes and consequences of the given 
properties. A HAZOP is based solely on expert 
statements. For this work expert statements have 
been acquired from operators of the pilot plant and 
compiled into a Qualitative Trend Table (QTT) in 
Table 3, instead of collecting them by a HAZOP. In 
all the QTTs the + represents an increasing 
qualitative trend of a property, and ÷ a decreasing 
qualitative trend. Each column represents a physical 
property, and the rows represents scenarios. 
Table 3 QTT for Expert statements 
 Qi Qu Qo Pi Pu Po PDR Fs 
Vu + + + + ÷ ÷ +   
Vu ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ + + ÷   
Vo + + ÷ + ÷ ÷ ÷   
Vo ÷ ÷ + ÷ + + +   
 
6.2 System Design 
The hydrocyclone of the pilot plant has been 
modelled in K-Spice for a dynamic process 
simulation. K-Spice is a software for simulating 
process conditions of offshore oil production plants, 
with the intent of plant design. 
 
The model includes a hydrocyclone module, an 
overflow and an underflow control valve, and a PID 
controller for the overflow valve. The underflow 
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valve has been given a specified setpoint, with no 
control. The model is shown in Fig. 6. This model 
has not been calibrated, and thus produces results 
different from that of the pilot plant. It is assumed 
that this difference is only numerical, but no 
differences exist at a qualitative level between the 
pilot plant, and the model behaviour. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Model of a hydrocyclone in K-Spice. 
A table similar to Table 3, has been compiled based 
on the experiments for the dynamic process 
simulation outlined in Table 2.  
 
The scenario of a closing overflow valve is shown in 
Fig. 7 for the overflow valve position, and the inlet, 
underflow and overflow pressure. It is assumed that 
the magnitude of an increase or decrease not is of 
importance for assessing the validity of how a high 
or low evidence from an alarm, is propagated 
through a model. 
 
Fig. 7. Closing overflow valve Vo DPS. 
The relationship between the three different 
pressures can be seen on Fig. 7. As the valve is 
closed, the pressure increases at inlet, underflow and 
overflow. This does however not necessarily give 
any indication of causality, and the increase could 
potentially be due to something different. Such 
causality could be investigated by statistical 
correlation methods[15]. 
Another model which will not be discussed here, has 
been included in the validation. It is a Flow 
Resistance based model (FR) of the hydrocyclone[17]. 
The Vu and Vo valves have been stepped individually 
in the range [0 1] to form a grid. At each valve 
position of Vo the physical properties have been 
averaged over all steps of Vu. The same is done for 
each valve position Vu, as an average of Vo. 
 
The flowrate is shown as a function of Vo positions 
in Fig. 8. A linear curve has been fitted to the model, 
to determine whether the flowrate decreases or 
increases, when closing or opening the valve. This 
procedure has been carried out for all physical 
properties Qi, Qu, Qo, Pu, and Po by using the model, 
and fitting a linear curve to the model. The results 
have been compiled into a table similar to Table 3, 
for the FR model. 
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Fig. 8 Average flowrate Qo of valve positions Vo for FR model. 
Similar to the FR model, a linear curve has been 
fitted to the process signals shown in Fig. 7, to 
determine the qualitative trend of the DPS, to 
produce a table similar to Table 3. 
 
6.3 System Operation  
A scenario for opening the underflow valve on the 
pilot plant is shown in Fig. 9. The qualitative trend 
of all sensor signals, for each of the four scenarios 
have been found by fitting linear curves to the 
empirical data, to produce Table 4. 
 
Fig. 9. Opening Vu on Pilot Plant. 
Table 4 QTT for Pilot plant experiments 
 Qi Qu Qo Pi Pu Po PDR Fs 
Vu + + + ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ 
Vu ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ + + + ÷ ÷ 
Vo + + ÷ + ÷ ÷ ÷ + + 
Vo ÷ ÷ + ÷ ÷ ÷ + ÷ ÷ 
 
6.4 Evaluation 
The two MFM models have been used to produce 
QTTs. For each model, Qu has been triggered in 
cause reasoning for the Vu case as either high or low, 
and Qo in the Vo case. The resulting QTT for the v1.1 
model is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 QTT for MFM Model v1.1 
 Qi Qu Qo Pi Pu Po PDR Fs 
Vu + + + ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷   
Vu ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ + + +   
Vo + + ÷ + ÷ ÷ ÷   
Vo ÷ ÷ + ÷ + + +   
 
All QTTs have been compared separately to the 
MFM models’ QTTs, and a voted QTT has been 
constructed based on agreement of the majority of 
models. For each fault, the MFM model has been 
compared to the other models separately with 
confusion matrices as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 Confusion Matrix: Qi for Vu+ with DPS 
Qi for Vu+  Predicted MFM 
  + ÷ 
Observed DPS 
+ TP FP 
÷ FN TN 
 
The simulated behaviour by the MFM model is 
considered as a prediction, and the other models as 
real observations. In this way the qualitative trend 
for all sensor values (Qi, Qu, etc.) of the MFM model 
in Table 5, has been compared to the trend of the 
other models’ QTTs. The predictions have been 
grouped as true positive (TP), true negative (TN), 
false positive (FP), and false negative (FN). Based 
on this, the Accuracy of the MFM model has been 
calculated as: 
𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒚 =
𝑻𝑷 + 𝑻𝑵
𝑻𝑷 + 𝑻𝑵 + 𝑭𝑷 + 𝑭𝑵
      (𝟏) 
 
The accuracy of the MFM models is shown based on 
the real observations from each of the other models 
(DPS, PP, Expert, FR, Voted) in Table 7.  
Table 7 Model performance 
Model PP DPS Expert FR Voted 
MFM v1.0 0.71 0.75 0.8 0.8 0.83 
MFM v1.1 0.86 0.92 1 1 1 
It is evident from Table 7, that the MFM model v1.1 
is a better representation of the sensors (components) 
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in the MFM model, than that of v1.0. 
 
This approach allows to measure model progression 
and improvement, and could potentially also be used 
as a quantitative approach to assess if changes to the 
Multilevel Flow Modeling methodology improves 
MFM’s ability to represent process systems. 
A similar approach to the work presented here, will 
be investigated and applied, for the purpose of 
validating MFM model predictions. The purpose 
will be to suggest an approach for model validation, 
by measuring how well MFM models can predict 
root causes or consequences in real-time on 
industrial systems. 
 
8 Conclusion 
An approach has been presented for validating the 
causal structure of MFM models, in order to 
measure model performance and ensure 
progression of model building. The approach 
identifies three stages at which MFM models can 
be validated with three different types of 
information: a concept, design and operation stage 
of process systems. The approach has been 
applied on two simple MFM models of a deoiling 
hydrocyclone for offshore PWT. Expert 
statements, a dynamic process simulation in K-
Spice, an empirical Flow Resistance based model, 
empirical data from a pilot plant, and a voting 
based model have been used for model validation. 
A metric from binary classification has been used 
for evaluating the MFM model coherence with 
evidence from the other approaches. The 
combined voting model had the best coherence 
with both MFM models. 
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